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Fairtrade City Subsidization and WTO Agreement Violations 
 
by David Collins∗ 
 
I)  Introduction 
Fairtrade is a product designation which denotes that a good’s original producers have 
obtained a minimum price that allows for their healthy living conditions and re-
investment into sustainable production. In the UK and many other developed 
countries, Fairtrade appears as a consumer label on products indicating that the goods 
conform to this production standard. Sellers of the goods in the UK are granted 
licenses by the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (‘FLO’), a private 
body partially funded by the European Commission, so that sellers can display the 
Fairtrade logo in conjunction with their products, which are sourced from producers 
whose working conditions and income levels conform to the organization’s standards. 
Currently FLO has certified more than one million producers worldwide in 58 
developing countries located in Africa, Asia and Latin America.1 In the UK the most 
common Fairtrade products are commodities such as coffee and bananas, although 
some firms sell products as diverse as Fairtrade clothing and jewellery. Although even 
proponents of Fairtrade acknowledge that it may harm producers in developing 
countries because of stimulating over-supply ultimately leading to price reductions in 
commodities such as coffee2, it enjoys wide popularity among consumers in 
prosperous nations who are willing to pay more for products because of the conditions 
in which they are produced. Sales of Fairtrade goods in the UK, the world’s leading 
                                               
∗
 Lecturer, City University London Law School, BA, JD (Toronto), MSc, BCL (Oxon) 
<david.collins@utoronto.ca> 
1
  <www.fairtrade.net> (June 2006) 
2
 J Draeger “Perking Up the Coffee Industry Through Fair Trade” 11 Minnesota Journal of Global 
Trade 337 (2002) at 368 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552925
 2 
Fairtrade market, amounted to £195 m in 20053 and have become a prominent feature 
of 21st century “ethical consumerism”, which as Andrew Fagan explains “offers the 
promise of transforming consumption … into a means for enhancing rather than 
restricting human rights.”4 
The aims of Fairtrade are undeniably laudable and its effects are probably 
beneficial to some, but the legality of Fairtrade in the context of international trade 
regulation is far from certain. That Fairtrade has largely escaped academic 
commentary has been explained by its informality – it is seen as a cultural rather than 
an economic activity.5 This brief article will consider one aspect of Fairtrade that is 
identifiably formal and of questionable legitimacy: the existence of local government 
policies in the UK that assist Fairtrade licensed goods and in so doing hinder sales of 
the non-Fairtrade goods with which they compete. These policies fall foul of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements which ensure that like products are treated in 
a non-discriminatory manner irrespective of their country of origin. Specifically, this 
article will argue that the Fairtrade City program is an illegal subsidization that 
amounts to de facto discrimination by country of origin, a clear violation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (‘GATT’, incorporating the text of 
GATT, 1947) Most Favoured Nation principle6 (MFN).  Potential WTO violations 
involving labelling and government procurement will also be considered briefly. We 
will begin by outlining the Fairtrade City regime. 
 
B)  Fairtrade Cities 
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In order to become designated as a Fairtrade City the Fairtrade Foundation requires 
that the town council of a candidate city support local Fairtrade industry in the 
following five ways:  
1. The local council must pass a resolution supporting Fairtrade, and serve Fairtrade 
coffee and tea at its meetings and in offices and canteens. 
2. A range of Fairtrade products must be readily available in the area's shops and 
served in local cafés and catering establishments (targets are set in relation to 
population).  
3. Fairtrade products must be used by a number of local work places (estate agents, 
hairdressers etc) and community organisations (churches, schools etc). 
4. The council must attract popular support for the campaign. 
5. A local Fairtrade steering group must be convened to ensure continued 
commitment to Fairtrade City status.7 
 
United Kingdom cities which have adopted these policies and have achieved the 
designation include Leeds, Edinburgh, Southampton, Newcastle, York, and more than 
twenty smaller boroughs, including some in London. Although the economic impact 
of such measures may ultimately be limited because of the small number of Fairtrade 
products sold relative to equivalent goods in general, the policies violate the WTO’s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (‘ASCM’). Through the 
Fairtrade City regime, local governments have adopted a policy by which goods of a 
certain origin (ostensibly meaning produced in a certain manner but by necessary 
implication also meaning from certain countries) are placed at an advantage relative to 
goods from other international producers (as well as local producers) who are not 
Fairtrade certified. This amounts to de facto discrimination that is oddly against like 
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domestic products8 but more importantly, among different nations, breaching MFN 
obligations.   
  
C)  Fairtrade City policies as Actionable Subsidies  
Fairtrade City policies which favour imported goods from Fairtrade producers may 
have the effect of reducing the sale of imports of similar goods from non-Fairtrade 
sources. This situation is encompassed by the GATT9 requirement that any ‘subsidy’ 
by a Member (of the WTO) that has the effect of reducing imports into that Member’s 
territory requires notification to all Contracting Parties of the extent of the subsidy 
and if serious prejudice has resulted to another Member, then consultations should 
occur with the objective of limiting the subsidy. The Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (‘ASCM’) outlines the definition of a subsidy: 
 
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: 
 
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this 
Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: 
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general 
infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
and 
(b)  a benefit is thereby conferred.10 
 
 
As public bodies, Fairtrade Cities violate this provision in two ways. First, the 
government provides the service of marketing Fairtrade goods through ‘the attraction 
of popular support’ including in some cities posters, newsletters or the preparation 
and distribution of a list of Fairtrade goods providers.11 This free advertising, which is 
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not extended to non-Fairtrade goods, amounts to a significant cost saving for Fairtrade 
producers and therefore is an indirect ‘benefit’. Second, local councils purchase 
Fairtrade goods, as seen in the policy on serving coffee and tea at council meetings 
and on council premises. The requirement that Fairtrade products be used by other 
community organizations such as churches contributes to this benefit, as more 
Fairtrade goods are sold resulting in more profit to the retailers and producers 
irrespective of objective criteria such as price or quality of their wares. We can infer 
that without the trade distorting effects of this subsidy, non-Fairtrade goods in the UK 
would be able to compete equally with Fairtrade goods. 
 These subsidies would likely not fall into the ‘Prohibited’ classification 
because they are not contingent on export performance nor upon the use of domestic 
over imported goods. However, Fairtrade City subsidies may be ‘Actionable.’ This 
designation requires the subsidy’s characterization as ‘specific’ as defined by the 
ACSM12 which states that ‘where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to 
which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain 
enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific.’13 Fairtrade City policies provide the 
abovementioned subsidies only to enterprises that are licensed by the Fairtrade mark. 
All enterprises are not ‘automatically eligible’14 because they must meet certain 
standards of production imposed by the FLO, one of which is that the imported goods 
must originate in developing countries. Fairtrade City subsidies are therefore specific 
and Actionable. 
 Actionable subsidies as specified by the ASCM are subsidies which lead to 
‘adverse effects’ of another Member. Adverse effects can consist either of ‘injury to 
the domestic industry of another member’; ‘nullification or impairment of benefits 
                                               
12
 Article 2.1 
13
 Article 2.1 a) 
14
 Article 2.1 b) 
 6 
accruing directly or indirectly to other Members’; or ‘serious prejudice to the interests 
of another member.’15 The ASCM elaborates that serious prejudice includes situations 
where the effect of the subsidy is ‘to displace or impede the imports of a like product 
of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member’16 or also if there are 
‘lost sales in the same market.’17 It must therefore be shown that non-Fairtrade firms 
were selling the same goods and second, that sales had decreased because of the local 
council’s assistance to Fairtrade goods. The words ‘another’ and ‘other’ indicate that 
the provision on specificity is concerned with MFN: damage done to other producers 
in other countries that have not been certified and whose sales in the UK suffer as a 
consequence. Thus, for example, the United States would need to show that sales of 
its cotton in the UK were diminished because of Fairtrade City policies advocating the 
purchase of Fairtrade cotton from India. Whether a situation like this has actually 
occurred would require further research, but there is clearly a perception of injury 
based upon unequal treatment.   
The ASCM’s provisions on Actionable Subsidies do not apply to measures 
assisting agricultural products because the Agreement on Agriculture establishes that 
domestic support for agriculture is deemed non-Actionable and exempt from remedial 
action.18 However the Agricultural Agreement’s use of the word ‘domestic’ implies 
that this exception was meant to cover situations where a Member’s subsidies assisted 
its own producers (as normal for a subsidy), not situations such as Fairtrade Cities 
where subsidies assist producers, seemingly counter-intuitively, from other Member 
states. Secondly, even if the Agricultural Agreement does exempt Fairtrade City 
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subsidies, it does so only for agricultural products and not Fairtrade goods such as 
jewellery or clothing, which are becoming increasingly popular.  
 
D) Remedies 
As Actionable Subsidies, Fairtrade City policies allow for international challenge 
under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism19 and the imposition of Countervailing 
Duties under national law20 provided that a causal link is established between the 
subsidy and the calculable injury.21 As suggested above, Fairtrade City policies which 
discriminate by production method (ie. disadvantaged sources) amount to a de facto 
violation of MFN: the Fairtrade designation is not available to producers from all 
Members, but only those in the developing world – goods from some Members are 
treated preferentially relative to others. Thus a Member which has no Fairtrade 
certified producers, such as Canada, might launch a complaint through the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) against the EU because Canada’s exports of certain 
goods to the UK are disadvantaged relative to goods from other Members which 
produce equivalent Fairtrade certified goods. The discrimination is rooted in the 
failure of the FLO to certify goods exported from developed nations. Consumers may 
assume that all goods produced within an economically strong nation are done so by 
people who are earning a fair wage and living well, but this disregards disadvantages 
suffered by particular regions or groups within those nations. The moral (if not the 
economic) justification for Fairtrade could be extended to impoverished producers 
such as North American aboriginals, but it is doubtful that goods from these sources 
would ever be Fairtrade certified because of the FLO’s focus on the developing world. 
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 The remedies available to a Member state which has been injured or whose 
benefits have been nullified or impaired due to Fairtrade City policies would be first 
to request consultation under the ASCM.22 Such consultations would aim at achieving 
a ‘mutually agreed solution’23 to the discrimination. If this stage is not fruitful then 
the formal Dispute Settlement Process would be engaged and were a Panel to find that 
subsidization had in fact caused injury then the subsidizing member would be 
required to ‘take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effect or …withdraw the 
subsidy.’24 The remedy with the sharpest teeth, Countervailing Measures, appears to 
be unavailable to a Member injured by Fairtrade City policies because the ASCM 
speaks of this remedy in conjunction with domestic injuries resulting from subsidized 
imports25 which does not apply to Fairtrade City assistance to goods sold within the 
UK, the effect of which is exclusively related to the reduction of sales for certain 
foreign goods. For example Japan could not impose duties on imported Fairtrade 
products from Members whose goods have been subsidized in the UK as the result of 
Fairtrade City measures. 
 
E)  Exceptions for Developing Country Assistance and General Exceptions 
The WTO regime contains numerous provisions to assist developing country 
Members.  Among the most significant of these is Part IV of GATT which requires 
that developed countries shall grant ‘more favourable and acceptable conditions of 
access to world markets’26 for products from the developing world and ‘give active 
consideration to the adoption of other measures [other than reduced tariffs] designed 
to provide greater scope for the development of imports from less developed 
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contracting parties.’27 Part IV of GATT was elaborated upon in the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES: Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries decision.28 This allows WTO Members to 
accord more favourable treatment to developing countries as a departure from the 
Most Favoured Nation principle.  The broad language of ‘other measures’ from 
GATT IV and ‘special treatment’29 from the CONTRACTING PARTIES decision 
may permit such actions as are seen in Fairtrade City regimes to assist the 
performance of goods from the developing world.  However such advantageous 
treatment is subject to the requirement that no ‘undue difficulties’ are suffered by 
other contracting parties.30 It might be difficult to argue that marketing assistance for 
Fairtrade goods amounts to an undue difficulty for non-Fairtrade goods, but a policy 
which prohibits outright both the sale of non-Fairtrade coffee on government premises 
or the use of non-Fairtrade coffee at government meetings might seem to do so.  The 
flexibility of the concept of ‘undue difficulty’ would seem to grant a developed 
Member which supplies non-Fairtrade goods ample room to require consultations 
with Members imposing the measure as permitted within the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES decision.31 
 Moreover, it is unlikely that developing country exceptions would exempt 
Fairtrade City policies from strict GATT adherence for two reasons. First, it must be 
acknowledged that much of the benefit that local councils bestow upon Fairtrade 
goods is enjoyed by retailers in the developed world who use the Fairtrade label as a 
promotional tool. Policies which assist these firms should accordingly not fall under 
the umbrella of protection afforded by developing world concessions. Second, it is 
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uncertain that Fairtrade as a philosophy is truly in-line with the WTO’s goal of long 
term market advancement of economically weak countries. Rather, Fairtrade policies 
encourage destructive dependence by the developing world upon primary goods that 
cannot ensure these nations’ long-term economic prosperity. While noting that market 
access for these primary goods should be fostered the Part IV of GATT also provides:  
 
The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed contracting parties will 
be facilitated by a diversification of the structure of their economies and the 
avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export of primary products.32   
 
This should operate as an overarching principle through which all WTO agreements 
are interpreted. Fairtrade’s devotion to goods such as coffee and textiles, which may 
help certain small suppliers in the short term, may damage the economies of 
developing nations by inhibiting market expansion into sectors that will ultimately 
yield higher income and provide greater stability, such as manufactured goods. Thus, 
until it can be empirically established that Fairtrade is actually helping the economies 
of disadvantaged nations on a macroeconomic scale, GATT violative Fairtrade City 
policies should not be saved by the WTO’s exemptions for assistance to developing 
country members.   
 It appears unlikely that the General Exceptions to GATT under Article XX 
would afford protection to Fairtrade City violations. The most likely of the 
enumerated grounds which would cover Fairtrade City regulations are probably the 
protection of public morals33 or the protection of human life or health.34 It is difficult 
to envision that the altruistic promotion of a foreign nation’s economy could be 
viewed as an aspect of morality in the sense that it affects British society in a tangible 
way. The poor living conditions among producers in developing countries is 
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conceivably a matter of human health but only in the worst cases where disease or 
famine has resulted from low income. Fairtrade goods do not yet appear to have been 
sourced from prison labour such that subsection e) would not apply.  It is possible that 
Fairtrade goods such as coffee might fit within exceptions for intergovernmental 
commodity agreements35 but this would offer no justification for goods such as 
jewellery or hand crafts. In noting that it is unclear which of the General Exceptions 
would apply to Fairtrade programs, Carlos Lopez-Hurtado observes that ‘the limited 
number of social policies enumerated in Article XX restricts the potential of that 
provision as a justification for social labelling regulations that are otherwise 
inconsistent with substantive provisions of the GATT.’36 Even if one of these 
categories could be stretched to encompass Fairtrade, these exceptions would still be 
subject to the chapeau of Article XX which prohibits arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the ‘same conditions prevail.’ As suggested 
above, poor living standards exist within in the developed world yet these nations are 
excluded from the Fairtrade regime such that the General Exceptions could not apply. 
 
F) Labelling 
Article IX of the GATT asserts that any labelling requirements imposed by Members 
should be as minimal as possible and done on a MFN basis. Accordingly any 
differentiation among ‘like’ products based on their source through marks of origin –
as in Fairtrade City labelling – would seem to be illegal from a WTO perspective.  
However in US Import Restrictions on Tuna37, a GATT panel found that voluntary 
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labelling schemes which restrict sales based on consumer choice (in that case 
labelling tuna ‘Dolphin Safe’) did not violate the MFN requirement of Article IX 
because they applied to all countries who caught tuna in a particular part of the ocean 
and therefore did not distinguish between country of origin. It is unclear whether such 
a ruling could be extended to Fairtrade labelling because advantages engendered by 
Fairtrade City measures are not strictly the result of consumer preference but a 
government choice to make a particular type of product more accessible to  
consumers primarily through advertising. Moreover, as we have seen, Fairtrade does 
indirectly distinguish between country of origin as it is a label which is only available 
to producers in the developing world. 
 There should be some concern that voluntary social labels such as Fairtrade 
are based upon a good’s process or production method (PPM) rather than on the 
characteristics of the product itself. However it is unclear whether regulations 
governing PPMs (such as labour standards) can be challenged under the substantive 
provisions of the GATT or under the Code of Standards of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade.38 Under the latter agreement, any regulation must not 
constitute an ‘un-necessary obstacle to trade.’ Carlos Lopez-Hurtado argues that even 
if labels that denote PPMs are subject to the TBT Agreement ‘an origin neutral label 
that works primarily as a market tool to inform and coordinate consumer preferences 
is one of the least restrictive mechanisms one could possibly imagine.’39 Still, 
Fairtrade City programs involve more than merely promoting the adoption of labels 
but provide free advertising and government purchasing which may transgress the as 
yet undefined concept of ‘reasonable measures’ under the TBT. 
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G)  Government Procurement 
Currently one expectation of becoming a Fairtrade city is the ‘lawful’ exploration of 
procurement from Fairtrade sources.40 As Fairtrade City policies are the result of 
actions by government bodies, an obvious issue raised is the WTO’s plurilateral 
Government Procurement Agreement which requires transparency and non-
discrimination in government purchasing (including purchasing by most local 
governments) from international suppliers.41 However it is unlikely that small local 
council purchases like coffee for meetings would meet the relatively high monetary 
thresholds of the GPA such that the agreement’s MFN obligations would not be 
engaged. Still, should larger government agencies in the UK choose to adopt Fairtrade 
City type policies in the future involving more costly procurement, for example 
Fairtrade clothing for postal workers uniforms, then the open tendering processes 
mandated by the GPA would have to be observed, unless that agreements’ exceptions 
for developing country suppliers were to apply to Fairtrade goods.   
  
H) Conclusion 
The extent of the injury sustained by non-Fairtrade producers at the hands of Fairtrade 
Cities might well be negligible given the relatively small quantity of goods sold in 
small Fairtrade shops throughout the UK. Perhaps a more serious problem is the 
perception of unfairness engendered by local governments’ favouritism towards 
certain goods that is clearly antithetical to the principles of free trade encapsulated by 
the WTO. Absent a quantifiable injury, the identification of which would require 
additional investigation, the formal Dispute Settlement mechanism of the WTO would 
be difficult to engage and therefore consultations through the WTO forum may be the 
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best recourse for injured Members. Rather than wait for this to be done, local councils 
in the UK should take the initiative to abandon discriminatory Fairtrade City policies 
not only because these measures transgress the spirit and letter of the WTO 
agreements, but also because it is beyond the authority of any elected government to 
assist with the marketing of selective businesses without sound economic 
justification.   
 
